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Title of Research paper: A study on the upsizing trend of containerships in 
international shipping industry 




The research paper is a study of the upsizing trend of containerships witnessed by the 
international shipping industry during the past decades, aiming to unearth the 
pushing factors and constraints of the trend from a systematic point of view and 
putting forward recommendations for concerned parties.  
 
The historical development of world containerships is briefly reviewed, and the 
characteristics of present world container fleet are summarized, also the future 
development of the upsizing trend of containerships is forecasted using data from 
different sources.   
 
The drivers that push the containerships becoming larger and larger, exampled by the 
economics of scale and development of ship design and building, are examined, 
while the constraints preventing the upsizing development of box carriers are 
explained and illustrated as well, like the systematic diseconomy, safety concerns, 
overcapacity, etc. 
 
A SWOT analysis is carried out on the employment of large-sized containerships 
from the point of shipowners.  Recommendations are put forward for interested 
parties, such as shipowners, port operators, maritime administrations, international 
v 
 
maritime community, and service providers, etc.  Distinctive recommendations for 
the international maritime community are proposed, wishing appropriate actions be 
taken to guide shipowners’ enthusiasm of purchasing and deploying large, even 
Ultra-large containerships (ULCS), in pursuit of lower unit costs.  
 
Keywords: upsizing; containership; drivers; constraints; economies of scale, 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
With the world largest ships record being broken now and then, the large-sized trend 
of world merchant ships, especially the containerships (also known as box carriers), 
has been being discussed frequently for years with lots of forecasts and predictions.  
Mainly, there are two opposite judgments as to the upsizing development.  One side 
believes that the ships will become bigger and bigger with the development of world 
seaborne trade and modern technology.  Yet another side thinks the trend will come 
to an end due to limits of routes and ports, as well as the law of diminishing returns.  
However, most of the previous studies are limited to analysis of economical size 
optimization or specific limiting factors from a microeconomic view.   
 
The paper restudies the topic with a wider scope of view and discusses the drivers 
and constraints of the trend by taking the transport system into account.  The 
economies of scale are mathematically analysed by quoting data from different 
sources, and the diseconomies of scale and diseconomies of the transport system are 
theoretically explained.  Special attentions are given to the international and 
national policies, as well as the safety concern like the weights of containers, the 
emergency response capabilities. 
 
The study is divided into six parts.  Chapter 1 gives a brief introduction to the study, 
and Chapter 2 reviews the evolution of containerships, summarizes the 
characteristics of the container fleet and gives some predictions as other studies did.  
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Various drivers that push the containerships becoming larger and larger are listed and 
examined in Chapter 3, such as the economics of scale, development of world 
seaborne trade and development of ship design and building technologies, etc.  
Unlike other studies, the limiting factors that prevent the upsizing development of 
box carriers are discussed in detail in Chapter 4, with special attention paid to the 
risk of diseconomy of the transport system and the safety concerns.  Chapter 5 
carries out a simple SWOT analysis on employing super-sized containerships for 
shipowners, and gives recommendations for stakeholders.  The main findings are 

























Chapter 2 Evolution of World Containerships 
 
2.1 Historical development of world containerships. 
The container era in shipping industry began in April 1956, when the Ideal X carried 
containers from Newark to Houston in its inaugural voyage.  Containerships were 
welcomed by world shipping companies because of its advantages of high efficiency 
of loading and unloading, less loss or damage of cargo and low operational cost 
(Levinson, 2006, p.1).  World containerships, used to be divided into different 
‘generations’ according to their designs, have undertaken several waves of 
developments, each wave representing a historical building level of containerships, 
but it is harder to classify containerships by generations with the rapid development 
of shipbuilding technologies.  Nowadays they are often grouped based on size 
categories.  For a rough guide, Figure 1 shows how containerships have evolved.  
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Figure 1- Evolution of containerships (all dimensions are in meters.) 
Source: Ashar and Rodrigue, 2012. 
Early containerships and fully cellular containerships (FCC). The early 
containerships like Ideal X were composed of modified bulk vessels or tankers that 
could transport up to 1,000 TEUs.  These ships were carrying onboard cranes as 
most port terminals were not equipped corresponding facilities to handle containers.  
At the beginning of the 1970s, container began to be massively adopted and the 
construction of the first FCC entirely dedicated for handling containers started.  
FCCs offer the advantage of using the whole ship to stack containers with cranes 
removed
1
 and more containers could be carried.  At the same time, specialized 
container terminals were constructed around the world to cater for these FCCs. 
(Rodrigue, Comtois & Slack, 2013). 
 
                                                             
1 Cranes remain today on some specialized containerships such as reefers. 
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Panamax and Post-Panamax.  In the 1980s, the hull dimensions of the largest 
containerships were limited by the length and breadth of the lock chambers of the 
Panama Canal.  However, economies of scale rapidly pushed for the construction of 
larger containerships.  The size limits of Panamax containerships were achieved in 
1985 with a capacity of 4,500 TEU.  The ships exceeding limits of the lock 
chambers are classified as Post Panamax.  In 1988, the APL C10 class 
containerships were introduced, exceeding the 32.2 m width limit of the Panama 
Canal for the first time (Rodrigue, Comtois & Slack, 2013).  The rapid growth of 
global trade provided Post-Panamax ships with substantial amount of cargo enabling 
them to be used profitably, and with the Panamax threshold being breached, ships’ 
capacities increased to 8,000 TEU. 
 
New Panamax and Post New Panamax.  New Panamax refers to ships designed to 
meet the new locks of the expanded Panama Canal expected to open in 2014, which 
can confer capacity of about 13,500 TEU (Baltic and International Maritime Council, 
2014, p.49).  Ships over the new dimension limits of the Panama Canal are 
categorized as Post New Panamax containerships, such as the E class
2
 and Triple-E 
class ships separately introduced by the Maersk in 2006 and 2013.  These ships are 
bigger than the expanded Panama Canal specifications and can handle up to about 
18,000 TEU (Rodrigue, Comtois & Slack, 2013). 
 
There are also ship sizes classified as Suez-Max and Post Suez-Max sizes limited by 
the dimension of the Suez Canal, and Malacca Max
3
 and Post Malacca Max 
constrained by the maximum permissible draft of the Malacca Strait (Xie, 2013).  
From the evolution process of containerships, we can see that although with 
                                                             
2 Capacity ranges from 11,000 to 14,500 TEUs, such as the Emma Maersk. 
3  A draught of 21 m is the maximum permissible draught through the Malacca Strait and the name 
“Malacca-max” has therefore been used. 
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constraints like the accommodating ability of Canals, containerships have broken the 
limits once and again and evolved into more efficient and larger-sized carriers. 
 
2.2  Characteristics of present world container fleet  
After more than fifty years of development, containerships carry an estimated 52 per 
cent of global seaborne trade in terms of value. Their share of the world fleet has 
grown almost eightfold since 1980 (United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, 2013, p.38), as goods are increasingly containerized for international 
transport, manifesting their own distinct characteristics.  
 
2.2.1 Higher Average TEU Capacity (ATC).  The world container fleet has been 
developing fast, with its ships growing both in number and size.  Figure 2 illustrates 
the changes of ATC of world container fleet by year of delivery.  From the curve, 
we can see that the ATC has been continuously increasing since 1980 and accelerated 
its increasing pace in 2008.  Notably, the ATC of 2014 (8336.16TEU) is 17 times 
bigger than that of 1980 (484.38TEU).  
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Figure 2 - World Container Fleet Average TEU Capacity by Year of Delivery, 
1980-2014 (TEU). 
Source: Compiled by the Author, data exported from CRS. 
 
2.2.2 Large ships take bigger share.  According to Clarkson’s statistics, there were 
only 5 Post-Panamax ships at the beginning of 1990 with 217,000 TEU capacities, 
which took less than 0.4% by number and 13.2% by TEU capacity of the whole fleet.  
Yet since then the Post-Panamax ships have been taking bigger and bigger share of 
the fleet both by number and TEU capacity.  By the start of 2014, there were up to 
1181 large ships (Post-Panamax) with capacity of 9,263,500 TEUs, taking 23.1% by 
number and 54.1% by TEU capacity.  Table 1 gives the specific composition of 







































































































- 8 - 
 
Table 1 - World container fleet compositions at year start (1990-2014). 
Type Feeder Handy Panamax Post-Panamax Post-Panamax Post-Panamax 
Total Fleet 
Range 100-999TEU 1000-2999TEU 3000&Over 3000-7999TEU 8000-11999TEU 12000&Over 
Start No 000TEU No 000TEU No 000TEU No 000TEU No 000TEU No 000TEU No 000TEU 
1990 625 293.8 578 1,036.40 83 287.4 5 21.7 0 0 0 0 1,291 1,639.40 
1991 636 300.8 622 1,112.10 95 332.1 5 21.7 0 0 0 0 1,358 1,766.70 
1992 661 312.5 662 1,186.60 110 387.5 6 26.1 0 0 0 0 1,439 1,912.70 
1993 680 326.8 700 1,247.20 126 444.6 12 52.6 0 0 0 0 1,518 2,071.30 
1994 681 327.8 759 1,334.80 148 529.2 12 52.6 0 0 0 0 1,600 2,244.40 
1995 714 344.9 831 1,450.60 175 632.5 15 65.9 0 0 0 0 1,735 2,493.90 
1996 780 384.9 855 1,477.20 250 904.1 32 150.5 0 0 0 0 1,917 2,916.70 
1997 842 421.8 935 1,611.40 275 999.5 53 271.8 0 0 0 0 2,105 3,304.50 
1998 911 463.2 1,043 1,809.90 311 1,142.00 71 370.6 2 17.8 0 0 2,338 3,803.50 
1999 980 503.5 1,128 1,963.30 345 1,282.40 84 447.8 6 51.8 0 0 2,543 4,248.80 
2000 999 516.5 1,169 2,044.60 352 1,313.00 94 504.4 10 85.9 0 0 2,624 4,464.40 
2001 1,021 531.9 1,231 2,159.50 377 1,421.60 124 676.6 14 121.4 0 0 2,767 4,911.00 
2002 1,014 532.6 1,305 2,303.00 396 1,493.20 186 1,037.70 15 129.6 0 0 2,916 5,496.10 
2003 1,020 542 1,352 2,402.30 440 1,678.80 226 1,279.90 19 165.1 0 0 3,057 6,068.20 
2004 1,040 558.7 1,411 2,526.40 477 1,829.60 258 1,479.40 25 214.4 0 0 3,211 6,608.50 
2005 1,074 584.7 1,461 2,634.00 518 2,016.10 292 1,681.30 40 338.9 0 0 3,385 7,255.00 
2006 1,125 624.1 1,551 2,814.20 583 2,302.70 319 1,843.80 72 610.4 0 0 3,650 8,195.20 
2007 1,184 672.2 1,681 3,067.40 645 2,565.00 356 2,075.40 131 1,120.70 3 47 4,000 9,547.40 
2008 1,241 719.9 1,835 3,337.20 740 2,973.40 389 2,287.40 164 1,409.90 7 109 4,376 10,836.60 
2009 1,281 756.9 1,977 3,592.60 832 3,364.90 426 2,524.30 213 1,853.30 9 138 4,738 12,230.20 
2010 1,253 745.7 1,953 3,546.90 885 3,615.80 455 2,711.20 243 2,129.30 14 206 4,803 12,954.90 
2011 1,234 741.3 1,974 3,588.70 956 3,937.10 490 2,918.70 281 2,471.80 39 544 4,974 14,201.60 
2012 1,217 736.7 1,987 3,606.90 960 3,953.80 541 3,215.10 317 2,805.20 74 1,005 5,096 15,322.70 
2013 1,182 719.1 1,929 3,476.80 948 3,928.70 579 3,415.00 352 3,118.70 117 1,574 5,107 16,232.70 
2014 1,148 701.9 1,887 3,401.60 899 3,761.30 630 3,667.30 400 3,541.20 151 2,055 5,115 17,128.70 
Source: CRS. 
 
2.2.3 World largest ship’s record is renewed more frequently.  Before Regina 
Maersk was delivered with a capacity of 6400 TEU
4
s in 1996, the largest 
containership’s record kept almost at the same level for a long time, as shown in 
                                                             
4  Maersk Line uses maximum load capacity in terms of filled TEUs to label its ships instead of the standard 
TEU capacity, which is always less than the standard nominal TEU capacity. 
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Figure 3.  After 1996, the world largest containership’s record has been breached at 
a faster pace.  For example, Emma Maersk was the biggest containership with 
capacity of 14,500 TEU in 2006.  Then, it became the 2
nd
 largest when CMA CGM 
Marco Polo was delivered in 2012 with capacity of 16,000TEU.  Eight months later, 
Maersk MC-Kinney Moller, the first Triple-E ship delivered in July 2013, took over 
the biggest position with capacity of 18,000 TEU.  Foreseeably, this title will be 
taken in November 2014 by the new biggest 19,000 TEU containership
5
 of China 
Shipping Container Lines (Hong Kong) Co. Ltd (Jallal, 2013).  
 
Figure 3- The Largest Available Containership, 1970-2013 (in TEUs) 
Source: people.hofstrs.edu 
 
2.2.4 Large containerships occupy the Mainlanes.   It is estimated that, as shown in 
Table 2, 62% of capacity on the Mainlane E-W route was provided by VLCSs 
(8,000+ TEU vessels) , while 36% was provided by LCS of 3,000-7,999 TEU.  In 
                                                             
5 At first, China Shipping booked five ships with capacity of 18400 TEUs in 2013, but they upgraded the 
booking to 19000 TEUs in early 2014. 
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total, 98% was provided by large ships, especially the Far East-Europe route and 
sequential route with 100% deployments.  Even for the Non-Mainlane E-W rout, 90% 
of the shipping capacity was provided by LCSs and VLCSs, while the North-South 
route employed LCSs and VLCSs for about 75% capacity.  













Route % of TEU 
Mainlane E-W 0% 2% 36% 62% 100% 
Transpacific 0% 2% 54% 44% 100% 
Far East-Europe 0% 0% 9% 91% 100% 
Transatlantic 0% 12% 87% 0% 100% 
Sequential 0% 0% 65% 35% 100% 
Non-Mainlane 
E-W 
1% 9% 75% 15% 
100% 
North-South 1% 24% 57% 18% 100% 
Intra-Regional 15% 58% 26% 0% 100% 
Intra-Asia 14% 63% 23% 0% 100% 
Intra-Europe 24% 52% 24% 0% 100% 
Other 4% 52% 44% 0% 100% 
Total 3% 17% 43% 36% 100% 
Source: CRS, MDS Transmodal Databank 
 
2.2.5 Improved performance.  Firstly, ships’ speed, powering and propulsion are 
greatly improved.  The typical design speed in service for large containerships has 
increased from 23.0 knots to 25.0 ~ 25.5 knots.  Concurrent with the growing size 
and speed have been improvements in the design of low speed diesel engines and 
propellers.  Secondly, better utilization of cargo space by increasing container 
stowage under deck, hatch width and depth.  Thirdly, the improvements of 
container securing systems permit more cargo to be stowed on deck, and the number 
- 11 - 
 
of tiers has increased from 4 to 10 (as shown in Figure 1).  Through these changes 
in vessel design, large containerships are able to perform more economically and 
profitably (Mercator Transport Group, 2005, pp.13-14). 
 
2.3 Forecast of the upsizing trend of containerships 
Based on the review of the historical development and the summary of the present 
characteristics of the world containerships, taking into the emerging of world largest 
ships into account, the question is whether the containerships upsizing trend will 
continue or it is reaching the boundary.  Here go the following predictions. 
Firstly, the orderings of large-sized containerships will continue.  This is highly 
likely for two reasons: firstly, operators are already doing “trials” on ULCSs for 
economy of scale, and for the time being this strategy seems successful.  There are 
shipowners declared their intention to follow Maersk’s new standards of 
containerships—the Triple-E class.  ULCSs are going to expand in size and number.  
Secondly, the Panama Canal will be able to cater for ships with a beam of 49m, equal 
to approx. 13,500 TEU.  So going forward, the rush to size up will continue.  
According to the forecast of Clarkson, world container fleet will be composed with 
fewer Panamax ships and the smaller ones both by number and TEU capacity, while 
the larger ships including Post-Panamax of different ranges will take bigger shares at 
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Table 3 - Containership Fleet & Forecast (2008-2016) 
Source: CRS. 
 
Secondly, the largest containership is approaching the limit again.  To build any size 
of containership is not a problem for today’s technology, but the operational 
conditions set the size borders.  Besides Panama Canal, there are many other limits, 
such as the Suez Canal, Malacca Strait, etc.  One rule is that the increase of ships’ 
size leads to the shrinkage of callable ports.  Although the remarkable designs of 
Maersk’s E and Triple-E class containerships successfully increase TEU capacity 
without much increase of ship’s draught, the increased beams make them unable to 
pass the expanded Panama Canal.  MOL estimates a Suezmax boxship would be 
able to carry 20,000 TEU of containers, and the designs of "Malacca Max" class 
could carry about 27,000-30,000 TEU (Rodrigue, Comtois & Slack, 2013), but there 













Start No 000TEU No 000TEU No 000TEU No 000TEU No 000TEU No 000TEU No 000TEU 
2008 1241  719.9  1835  3337.2  740  2973.4  389  2287.4  164  1410.0  7  109.0  4376  10836.6  
2009 1281  756.9  1977  3592.6  832  3364.9  426  2524.3  213  1853.0  9  138.0  4738  12230.2  
2010 1253  745.7  1953  3546.9  885  3615.8  455  2711.2  243  2129.0  14  206.0  4803  12954.9  
2011 1234  741.3  1974  3588.7  956  3937.1  490  2918.7  281  2472.0  39  544.0  4974  14201.6  
2012 1217  736.7  1987  3606.9  960  3953.8  541  3215.0  317  2805.0  74  1005.0  5096  15322.7  
2013 1182  719.1  1929  3476.8  948  3928.7  579  3415.0  352  3119.0  117  1574.0  5107  16232.7  
2014 1148  701.9  1887  3401.6  899  3761.3  630  3667.3  400  3541.0  151  2055.0  5115  17128.7  
2015(f)  685.5  3335.6  3556.5  3858  4027.4  2590  18053 
2016(f)  667  3278.5  3412  4001.3  4627.7  3285  19271.5 
5 Yr Trend  -2.1%  -1.8%  -2.8%  6.5%  13.4%  43.3%  6.3% 
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are operational limitations to deploy these gigantics, and the largest operational size 
is likely to be achieved soon.  
 
Thirdly, development of containerships’ sizes will continue regardless of the limiting 
factors.  By reviewing the historical development of containerships, we can see that 
for certain period of time there were always “limit sizes” of containerships, but these 
“limit sizes” had been broken one by one.  Development of containerships’ sizes 
and the corresponding constraints are in dialectical unity.  Constraints limit 
containerships’ size from continuous growing, while new development will bypass 
the old constraints, but confront new constraints again.  Then the dialectical process 
repeats.  Therefore, development of ships’ sizes is doomed to happen irrespective of 


























 World War, two main characteristics of international shipping are trends 
of specialization and gigantism (Ma, 2013).  In 2011, Maersk Line signed contracts 
with Korea Daewoo Shipbuilding for 20 Triple-E containerships to be delivered 
during 2013 and 2015 (Wikipedia, 2014a), once again justified the trend of gigantism 
or upsizing trend.  The main factors driving this trend are discussed below.  
 
3.1 Economies of Scale. 
Economies of scale normally refer to the economic relationship between cost and 
ship size.  Shipping is about moving cargos at sea, so the business focuses on the 
unit cost.  The annual unit cost (cost per TEU) of a containership can be obtained by 
the following formula (Stopford, 2009, p.223): 
               C = 
              
   
                         ······formula (1) 
Where C is the annual cost per TEU; OC the annual operating cost; PM the periodic 
maintenance per annum; VC the annual voyage costs; CHC the annual 
cargo-handling costs; K the annual capital cost; TEU the nominal TEU capacity of a 
ship.  The economies of scale can be explained by formula (1), as the operating, 
voyage and capital costs do not increase in proportion to the deadweight of the vessel, 
so using a bigger ship reduces the unit freight cost (Stopford, 2009, p.224).  
According to Clarkson’s calculations under certain assumptions, as illustrated in 
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Figure 4, the owner of a large ship has a substantial cost advantage compared with 
owner of a smaller one.  The cost of $648 per TEU for a 1200 TEU vessel falls 
sharply to $498 per TEU for a 2600 TEU vessel, and with the TEU capacity 
increases the cost per TEU goes further downwards.  The cost of an 11,000 TEU 
vessel ($360) is almost just half of the cost of the 1,200 TEU vessel ($648).  The 
economies of scale play the fundamental role in the upsizing trend of containerships. 
 
Figure 4 - Containership cost per TEU transported. 
Source: Martin Stopford. (2009). Maritime Economics (Chapter 13).  Data from 
CRS, HSH Nordbanlk and Drewry Shipping Consultants. 
 
3.2 Strong demand derived from growing world seaborne trade. 
Thanks to the open market economic development policy, diminishing trade barriers, 
bilateral and multilateral trade agreements and the development of transport (Ma, 
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2013), world merchandise trade has been growing at rapider pace, as illustrated in 
Figure 5.  World merchandise trade has more than tripled since 1990, and world 
seaborne trade synchronously grew with world merchandise trade with almost 2.5 
times increase compared to that of 1990.  The rapid growth of world seaborne trade 
creates strong and sustainable demands for international shipping services.  By 
sharply cutting costs and enhancing reliability, larger containerships, including 
VLCSs and ULCSs, gain and consolidate their marketable proposition with 
substantial amount of cargo waiting to be shipped.  Therefore, another key driver of 
upsizing trend of containerships is the strong demand for shipping services. 
 
Figure 5 - The OECD industrial production index and indices for world GDP, 
merchandise trade and seaborne shipments (1975–2013), (1990 = 100) 
Source: UNCTAD, WTO, and CRS. 
 
3.3 Containerization of cargos. 
The trend of containerization of cargos is a driver that might be easily neglected but 
closely interrelated with the trend of upsizing of containerships.  Actually, 
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containerization and upsizing ships are in mutual promotion relationships.  
Although containerization was a completely new way of organizing transport 
involving massive capital investment, it is a rational way of transporting goods with 
advantages of almost no limit to commodities’ types, effective loading/unloading 
operations, internationally standardized sizes, automated handling system and low 
shipping costs
6
(Nakazawa, 2013, p.50).  As Maritime Economics put it, by adopting 
containerization the industry opened the floodgates for global commerce (Stopford, 
2009, p.41), and it has also led to an increased demand for container transportation, 
thus driving the upsizing trend of containerships. 
 
3.4 Innovation of shipbuilding technologies. 
The coming into being of large-sized containerships benefits a lot from the 
innovations of shipbuilding technologies, especially innovations in ship design and 
propulsion.  Firstly, new material and hull design technologies make larger 
containerships’ hull strong enough to resist transvers and longitudinal bending forces 
and moments, such as the use of high strength steel.  Secondly, the proportion of 
ship’s principal dimensions has been further optimized both for capacity and cargo 
handling efficiency.  For example, the Triple-Es’ innovative separation of bridge 
and engine room without losing visibility
7
 makes more room for ship’s container 
accommodation ability (Maersk, 2012).  Thirdly, more powerful, efficient and 
reliable propulsion systems are produced to meet the increasing thrust demands of 
large-sized ships, as well as to reduce emission and cut fuel consumptions.  The 
twin drive configuration of the Triple-E class ships is one good example.  Through 
two engines driving two propellers, the Triple-Es are able to retain the efficiency 
created by the slower two-stroke engines and greater pushing power provided by 
                                                             
6 Before containerization: shipping costs take 5~10% of the selling price, after: shipping costs take only around 
1% of the selling price. 
7 The SOLAS convention includes requirements for bridge visibility on such large ships. 
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their twin propellers (Wikipedia, 2014a). 
 
3.5 Development of information technology 
Nowadays, almost every aspect of people’s life is greatly influenced by the rapid 
development of information technology.  The influences on upsizing trend of 
containerships are mainly in two ways.  Firstly, developments of information 
exchange and management systems have greatly supported the cargo handling 
processes and facilitated the size merits of bigger containerships, which were 
immensely productive---reducing cycle times by 40%, errors by 30% and saving $5 
per document (Stopford, 2009, p.42).  Secondly, the operations of containerships 
become more and more dependent on the information technology.  The systems for 
handling containers have become so sophisticated that it is impossible to carry out 
container handling operations if the systems break down and more value of the 
shipping business is being squeezed out. 
 
3.6 Stricter emission control requirements.  
Under the emission control requirements of MARPOL 73/78 Annex VI, 
containerships are required to meet related emission reduction targets.  Often larger 
ships mean low emission rate, and this could be explained by the EEDI index and 
Specific Tractive Force (P/WV) (Nakazawa, 2013, p.8).  EEDI can be obtained by 
the following simplified formula: 




              = 
 ×SF × F
DW × 
  = 
P
DWT×V
 ×SFC×CF     ······formula (2) 
P is the power of main and auxiliary engines; SFC is specific fuel consumption; CF 
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conversion factor between fuel consumption and CO2 emission; DWT Deadweight 
and V ship speed.  By replacing DWT with W (sum of ship’s weight, fuel weight 
and payloads), then EEDI can be expressed as: 
                 EEDI= 
P
W×V
 ×SFC×CF                 ······formula (3) 
As SFC and CF are constants, so EEDI is decided by P/WV with direct proportion, 
which means the lower the P/WV the better the EEDI.  Because the minimum 
P/WV can be calculated by the following formula (Nakazawa, 2013, p.75)： 











                          ······formula (4) 
Where, Cf is the frictional coefficient, ηP the propulsive efficiency, ∇ displacement 
of the ship.  From this formula, we can see that the minimum P/WV is determined 
by ship’s speed V and ship’s displacement ∇.  For certain speed V, the bigger the∇ 
the lower the P/WV.  According to formula (2), the EEDI will be better if the 
displacement becomes bigger, namely the bigger ships can achieve lower EEDI (less 
fuel consumption and CO2 emission).  For example, Maersk’s Triple-Es’ propulsion 
system could cut CO2 emissions by 20% compared with the E-class ships and 50% 
lower than the average level of the industry (Maersk Line, 2012).  Therefore, 
employing larger ships is one important way to realize the emission control targets 
for shipowners. 
 
3.7 Pressure of commercial competition  
Where there is profit, there is competition.  Fierce competitions exist within the 
container shipping industry.  Every shipowner wants to take the leading role by 
providing better service and occupying bigger share of the supply market.  Ordering 
large-sized containerships is an easy option to expand TEU capacity and market 
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share.  For decades, Maersk has been the leader of the container shipping industry 
with its super TEU capacity and world biggest containerships at different times, 
which had even become the standards or benchmarks for other shipowners’s 
newbuildings like the latest Triple-Es.  Owning super-sized ships is becoming label, 
even advertisement, of powerful capacity within the industry, more and more 
shipowners join the rush of booking bigger and bigger containerships.  
 
3.8 Development of port facilities. 
Nowadays, the customers are more and more sensitive to transport time.  
Fortunately, the development in port facilities limits this risk to the minimum.  
Although it is the ships’ upsizing trend leads the development of port facilities, the 
upgrading of port facilities in return further promotes the development of upsizing of 
ships.  Advanced and high efficient ports, berths and terminal have been built over 
the past decades around the world together with automated facilities, cranes, loading 
and unloading controlling systems, which make larger ships possible to realize the 
efficiency of operation.  Taking container cranes for example, in 1970 a port crane 
would typically be capable of dealing with containers stacked 35m high, by 1995 this 
reached 52m, then in 2002 went up to 58 meters.  With the advent of Triple-Es, 
cranes are able to deal with stacks of up to 69 m (Preparing the ports, 2013).   
Figure 6 shows how container cranes have evolved in size over the years.  Not just 
the span and reach have rapidly increased, but also the handling capacities, which 
have increased from 15~18 boxs/hour to 28~32 boxs/hour with only one person for a 
gantry crane (Nakazawa, 2013, p56). 
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Figure 6- Evolution of Gantry Cranes 
Source: worldslargestship.com. 
 
3.9 Canal expansions 
To ensure 100% containerships being able to pass, Suez Canal Authority had 
completed its planned phase to increase the Canal permissible draft to 22.12m at 
January 2010, and is running a project to increase the depth of western channels of 
the Suez Canal from 14.6m to 15.8m in order to allow giant containerships to pass 
through and reduce their total transit time (Suez Canal Authority, 2014).  Another 
important driver is the expansion of the Panama Canal, a critical node in 
international trade.  The original locks of Panama Canal were once the limits for 
world largest ships, constraining the upsizing trend.  However, with the expansion 
project launched in 2006 and to be completed in 2014, the passage capacity of 
Panama Canal is going to be enlarged to around 13,500 TEUs by deepening (from 
12.6m to 16.8~18.3m) and widening (from 33.5m to 54.9m) existing channels, as 
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shown in Figure 7.  The expansion of Canals will definitely influence the structure 
and deployment of container fleet.  According to Drewry’s research, about half of 
existing Panamax containerships with capacity of 4000-5000 TEU are very likely to 
be demolished when the expansion project completed, as shipowners would 
desperately rather deploy larger ships for lower cost advantage and result in 
overcapacities of the Panamax ships.  Therefore, the upsizing trend of 
containerships will be encouraged by the expansion project. 
 
Figure 7 - Existing lock and new lock of the Panama Canal. 
Source: WMU, MSEM 2013-2014, Maritime Economics and Logistics Handout. 
 
3.10 Pricing fall of building ships. 
Although pricing of building new ships is not the decisive factor for upsizing trend, it 
plays an important role of stimuli.  From Figure 8, we can see that there has been 
big fall in newbuilding prices since 2008.  Compared with the prices when the 
Triple-Es was signed in February 2011, about 20 percent had dropped when the latest 
two followers---United Arab Shipping Co. (UASC) and China Shipping Group 
booked the similar sized containerships in 2013.  Maersk paid an average of $185m 
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each for the Triple-Es, while China Shipping paid $136.6m apiece and UASC paid 
about $150m because of different design features (Porter, 2013).  Similar capacity 
but at considerably cheaper prices, the fall of newbuilding prices encourage 
shipowners to order larger ships in order to obtain a lower slot cost. 
  
Figure 8 - Containership New Building Price Index 



















Chapter 4 Constraints of containerships’ upsizing trend 
 
As a coin with two sides, with the drives for the upsizing trend of containerships, 
there are constraints limiting the trend as well.  The main constraints are discussed 
below. 
 
4.1 Diseconomies of scale. 
The economies of scale are not a sure thing, as they are also constrained by other 
laws, such as the law of diminishing return and marginal cost, which may lead to 
diseconomies of scale.  Margin is a very important concept in economics, and the 
diseconomies of scale can be explained from two aspects, namely the marginal return 
and marginal cost.  Viewing from the return side, as shown in Figure 9, according 
to the law of diminishing returns, increasing quantity of a variable factor with other 
factors fixed, the marginal product (return) and the average product of the variable 
factor firstly increase but eventually decrease.  Applying to the size changes of 
containerships, with the increase of size (TEU capacity) the marginal return increase 
at first, then the return reaches peak at certain size, be it 8000 TEU or 15000 TEU, 
but over that size will lead to decrease of the marginal return and average return. 
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Figure 9 - Law of Diminishing Return. 
Source: WMU, MSEM 2013-2014, Maritime Economics and Logistics Handout. 
 
While viewing from the cost side, the law of marginal cost plays the invisible hand.  
Marginal cost is the change in the total cost that arises when the quantity produced 
increases by one unit, or it is the cost of producing one more unit of a product.  It 
decreases with the increase of production at first stage, when the production reaches 
certain quantity, marginal cost reaches the lowest, then increases dramatically with 
the increase of quantity of production, going through a “u” curve, see Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10 - Marginal Cost Curve. 
Source: Wikipedia, Marginal Cost. 
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For containerships, with the increase of containers carried on a ship, the marginal 
cost decreases at first.  When the total containers reach certain number, the marginal 
cost reaches the lowest.  Over that number, then more containers will lead to higher 
marginal cost.  This has been verified by the Drewry analysis in 2003, as shown in 
Table 4.  They found that the marginal cost of containerships with 10,000 TEU 
capacities was the lowest under setting conditions.  However, the analysis jumped 
too wide from 10,000TEU to 18,000TEU, which makes the conclusion less 
persuasive.  
Table 4 - Marginal Cost and Average Cost per TEU by Ship Size 
          Size 
Costs 
4000TEU 6000TEU 8000TEU 10000TEU 18000TEU 
Marginal Cost  
Per TEU($) 
9980 9250 8750 7500 12600 
Average Cost  
Per TEU ($) 
11250 10583 10125 9600 10100 
Ship Building 
Cost (m$) 
4500 6350 8100 9600 12120 
Source: Drewry Shipping Consultants Limited 2003. 
Another analysis made by Drewry was focused on the operating costs of 
containerships.  The analysis was to find out the minimum operating costs per TEU 
for different ship sizes.  The total annual operating costs per TEU fall from $2,301 
for 4,000 TEU vessel to $1,950 for 6,000 TEU ship, and the 12,000TEU size is 
found to be the most economical ship type ($1413), but there are no data above 
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Table 5 - Annual Operating Costs per TEU by Ship Type ($) 
Size 
Factor 
4000TEU 6000TEU 10000TEU 12000TEU 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
Crew 233 10.13% 133 6.82% 83 5.79% 83 5.87% 
Insurance 200 8.69% 167 8.56% 183 12.77% 167 11.82% 
Administration 34 1.48% 33 1.69% 33 2.30% 17 1.20% 
Port Charges 500 21.73% 450 23.08% 300 20.94% 283 20.03% 
M&R 217 9.43% 167 8.56% 100 6.98% 133 9.41% 
Storage & Lub 50 2.17% 50 2.56% 17 1.19% 30 2.12% 
Fuel 1067 46.37% 950 48.72% 717 50.03% 700 49.54% 
Total 2301 100% 1950 100% 1433 100% 1413 100% 
Source: Drewry Shipping Consultants Limited 2003. 
Although Drewry’s results might be not so accurate, actually there are huge 
differences among operation costs of same ship size on same routes for different 
shipowners under different conditions (Xu, 2007, p5), yet they testified the functions 
of the economic laws of margin.  The development of upsizing trend of 
containerships is ruled by these laws. 
 
4.2 Diseconomies of the transport system.  
With the economies of scale of shipping, there are possibilities of diseconomies of 
scale for the container transport system.  The transportation of containers at sea is 
just one part of the whole container transport chain.  Deploying ULCS ships could 
lower the transport costs of containers at sea, but the cost at sea is just one third of 
the whole transport costs (Xu, 2007, p.3), which means the ULCS ships have to 
integrate with landside segment of the transport system in order to benefit from their 
sizes.  Unfortunately the landside transport costs will increase dramatically as the 
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ships’ sizes become bigger and bigger, because more containers used to be shipped 
directly from near port have to be transferred to hub port for shipment by truck or 
train, which might be far away from the place of origin and take more transport costs.  
So the saving of costs at sea might be offset by the increase of landside costs leading 
to the increase of the total costs of the transport system.  The diseconomy of the 
transport system will get rid of the super-sized ships through market competitions 
and limit the further development of the large-sized trend. 
 
4.3 Intensive capital requirement. 
Although the mega containerships could realize the economies of scale, they require 
too much capital investment.  Besides their high building prices of hundreds of 
millions dollars, the operation of ULCSs asks for large amount of money as well.  
The Triple-Es are claimed as technological marvels for their new concept in hull 
design and layout, but the marvels are too costly for most shipowners within the 
industry.  Each costs $190m for building with the underlying price $160m plus the 
costs (Maersk likes to call it investment) for energy efficiency optimizing 
innovations $30m (Jallal, 2013).  At the same time, considering the widespread 
practices of slow-steaming, there are no much difference in slot costs between VLCS 
and ULCS (NYK, 2014).  Therefore, shipowners are likely to be constrained by the 
huge investment of building ULCSs or even bigger ships. 
 
4.4 Depressed market and high fuel costs 
Shipping industry subjects to the market cycles, like all other industries.  A typical 
shipping cycle usually includes four stages: trough, recovery, peak and collapse 
(Stopford, 2009, p.98).  This can be seen from the charter rates of containership as 
shown in Figure 11.  The Index was 47 in 2001--at the trough stage, then it went 
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into the recovery state with charter rates rose.  From 2004 to2007, the rates were at 
peak stage with high index value, but in 2008 the collapse stage started with 
precipitate fall of charter rates, and then another cycle began. 
 
 
Figure 11 - Containership Charter Rates Index (1993=100) 
Source: Compiled by the Author.  Data based on Containership Charter Rates of 
CRS, Container Intelligence Quarterly (First Quarter 2014). 
 
The 2008 economic and financial crisis threw far-reaching negative impacts on the 
world economy and trade, and the performance of international seaborne trade 
remains vulnerable to downside risks.   Freight rates were suppressed by both the 
depressed market and the oversupply of capacities (UNTAD, 2013, p.68).  At the 
same time, bunker oil prices have been increased more than six times for 380cst 
(from 98.8$/t to 619.9$/t) and five times for MDO (from 172.2$/t to 967.3$/t) since 
1995, see Figure 12.  The overall low freight rates, coupled with high bunker prices, 
the result is that container shipping has entered an ear of meager profit, which 
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Figure 12-Worldwide Average Bunker Price by Year. 
Source: Compiled by the Author. Data based on the Worldwide Bunker Price Trends 
of CRS, Container Intelligence Quarterly (First Quarter 2014). 
 
4.5 Emergency response capability 
According to the theory of risk management, bigger ship means bigger risk of 
accident
8
.  Large containerships are less flexible both enroute and at berth, as they 
have bigger inertia and larger blind zones for lookout, especially the awkward layers 
of containers loaded onboard.  On August 5
th
 2012, a leakage of containerized 
dangerous goods happened on board Maersk Kuantan in Yantian International 
Container Terminal.  Even though the leakage was harmlessly treated in the end, the 
accident aroused the awareness of the emergency response to bigger containerships.  
During the dealing process of the accident, the onsite officers could see clearly which 
container was leaking, but it was very hard to stop the leakage due to the high layers 
                                                             
8 Risk= Probability * Consequence, bigger ships will lead to massive consequence once accident happened, so 
bigger ships mean bigger risk. 
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and stacks of containers (Xie, 2013).  Except for Maersk Kuantan, there are other 
accidents, like the container fire on the Eugen Maersk and flooding of Emma Maersk, 
which are found harder to respond effectively to the emergency situations.  
Shipowners come to realize the fact that the bigger the ship the harder and less 
effective to respond in emergency, and this in a way will prevent the trend of 
employing larger ships. 
 
4.6 Issue of Container weight 
The advantage of container is safe, standardized and high efficient of loading and 
unloading, but one big issue is the containers are not accurately weighed, which 
affects the stability of container stacks and containerships.  Shippers tend to 
understate the weight of their containers to reduce freight charges.  Not clearly 
knowing the cargo weighs can lead to serious damage to ships.  Discrepancy 
between declared weights and actual weights might be the reason for the crack and 
sinking of the five-year old Post-Panamax 8,110TEU containership MOL Comfort in 
June 2013.  Also the Maritime Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) in the UK 
found that 20% of the containers being analyzed were more than 3 tonnes different 
from their declared weights (Baumler, 2013).   Moreover, on larger ships, the 
amount of containers carried increases uncertainty levels and may seriously affect 
ships’ stabilities, so the issue of weight prevents ships’ sizes from unlimited 
development.  
 
4.7 Accommodating capability of port. 
Ports are vital components of transport system and provide a crucial interface 
between land and sea.  Maersk is loading around 15,000 -16,000TEU on 
its Triple-Es instead of the full capacity---18,270TEU, largely because so far only 
two ports in the world can fully accommodate them, namely Yantian and Tanjung 
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Pelepas (Lin, 2014a).  The accommodating capability of port bottlenecks the 
operation of large ships. 
 
4.7.1 Limitation by water depth.  The depth of the approach channels and berths 
of ports is the main constraint for larger containerships.  Generally, the larger the 
containership the deeper draught when fully loaded, and higher requirements for the 
water depth of channels and berths.  The design draught of the ships in operation 
with capacities over 80,000 TEU is normally 14.5m, and the depth for port’s 
channels and berths should be no less than 15m for safe navigation and 
berthing/unberthing.  However, there are only a few ports with enough water depth, 
such as Rotterdam and Singapore (Liu & Chen, 2005, p58).  Another concern is the 
decreasing Under Keel Clearance (UKC).  With the increasing ship size, more and 
more UKC has been eaten up.  Figure 13 shows the changes of UKC observed in 
Moreton Bay.  In some parts there is now less than 1m clearance left, and ships are 
at high risk of grounding and other accidents due to worse maneuverability without 
enough water depth.   In Hong Kong, 10% UKC must be maintained throughout the 
entire berthing/unberthing operation to ensure safe navigation (HKMD, 2012, p7). 
 
- 33 - 
 
Figure 13- Changes of UKC in Moreton Bay. 
Source: brisbanepilots.com.au. 
 
4.7.2 Limitation by handling capability.  The economies of scale of bigger ships 
closely relate with cargo handling capability of ports, which largely decide the 
port-calling time.  Limited by the handling capacities in most ports, bigger ships 
have to spend longer time in ports for loading and uploading operations in addition to 
waiting time, which greatly impacts the economies of scale due to the increase of 
operating costs for longer port-calling time (Xu, 2007, p3).  This is way the 
Hub—Spoke model is adopted in operation, which could save port-calling time by 
reducing direct-calls.  Even so, bigger containerships still will lose their advantage 
in cutting operating costs without high efficient handling capacity.  However, 
upgrading facilities to increase handling efficiency is an easy but expensive option.  
For example, to receive the Triple-Es, eight high efficient but costly portainers with 
out-reach span of 23 rows of standardized container should be equipped (Maersk 
Line, 2012).  
4.7.3 Limitation by collection and distribution (C&D) capability.  Not isolated 
islands at sea, large containerships have to link with other segments of the transport 
system---the port operations and inland transport system to realize the systematic 
economies of scale.  The C&D capability of port includes storage, collection and 
distribution of inbound and outbound containers.  Also railways, roads and inland 
waterways converge on ports, all these transport segments must be linked and 
managed efficiently (Stopford, 2009, p.81).  With large-sized ships carrying large 
amount of containers, the C&D capability of port is seriously challenged.  For ports 
with biggest container throughput like Shanghai and Yantian, the C&D of containers 
heavily rely on the road transportation, which are often jammed with trucks queening 
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in line waiting for picking up or delivering containers.  Yet the improvement of 
C&D capability means port modification and transport system transformation, which 
takes years and huge investment.  The desynchronized C&D capability of ports will 
greatly affect the operation of large containerships for delay delivery of customer’s 
cargo (Xu, 2007, p4), thus limiting the further development of containerships’ 
large-sized trend.   
 
4.7.4 Limitation by third party services.  Except for the port facilities and 
capabilities, there are limitations from third party services, such as tugs, pilots and 
forwarders, etc.  Take tug service for example, the towing power of tug is 
challenged by ULCSs with their side windage area larger than 10,000m
2
 and it 
becomes harder to tie and tow cables as the higher freeboards of ULCSs (Yang, 2011, 
p.10).  Although some ports are trying new tugs, such as the Robert tugs (designed 
by Robert Allan LTD of Canada) in Ningbo Port, their adaptation to the large 
containerships is still to be verified.  Without synchronized development of the third 
party services, the efficiency of the larger containerships will be lowered and the 
costs of operation will increase greatly (Zheng & Lin, 2005, p.79-80). 
4.8 Limitation by shipping routes. 
Routes are one of the major factors limiting the upsizing trend of containerships, as 
their permissible dimensions decide the maximum size of containerships operating 
along them.  Among the international routes, the main constraints are the water 
depths and widths of the Suez Canal, Panama Canal and Malacca Strait, as they are 
located at the forts of the shortest international routes.  Large-sized ships exceeding 
the permissible max sizes can only operate in limited routes or detour.  If the cargo 
flow changes, then the large ships will be seriously impacted for their limitation to 
routes.  As illustrated in Table 6, 84% TEU in the Mainlane E-W is provided by the 
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VLCSs, 61% of which are operated in the Far east-Europe route, which are sufficient 
in depth and long in distance, giving enough places for VLCSs’ economies of scale.  










Route % of TEU 
Mainlane E-W 0% 5% 41% 84% 49% 
Transpacific 0% 1% 19% 18% 15% 
Far East-Europe 0% 0% 5% 61% 24% 
Transatlantic 0% 3% 10% 0% 5% 
Sequential 0% 0% 7% 5% 5% 
Non-Mainlane 
E-W 
2% 5% 17% 4% 
8% 
North-South 10% 33% 31% 12% 24% 
Intra-Regional 87% 57% 10% 0% 17% 
Intra-Asia 45% 34% 5% 0% 9% 
Intra-Europe 39% 15% 3% 0% 5% 
Other 4% 8% 3% 0% 3% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: CRS, MDS Transmodal Databank. 
4.9 Pressure of overcapacity. 
The economic crisis in 2008 resulted in the reduction of demand for container 
transport, leaving the shipping market with surplus capacity.    Ordering larger 
ships is one of the simplest and most straightforward ways to lower slot costs but 
creating a vicious circle of recurring overcapacity, because every shipowner is trying 
his best to manage costs, eventually shipowners are building larger ships leading to 
another round of overcapacity.  According to statistics in early 2013, containerships, 
among the different vessel types, had the highest utilization rate--99.85% (UNCTAD, 
2013, p.64).  However, the high utilization rate hides the real oversupply as the data 
excluded the idle capacities.  If idle capacities are considered, only about 95 to 96 
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percent of the fleet was in service (Clarkson Research Services, 2013, p.103).  In 
addition, slow steaming has helped to absorb an additional capacity of about 1.7 
million TEU, equivalent to more than 10% of the existing fleet.  The overcapacity 
of containerships leads to low freight rates and fierce competition, and shipowners 
might be at loss or just earn meager profit, thus constraining the upsizing trend.  
 
4.10 Administrative policies. 
On one hand, international maritime instruments might be constraints of the upsizing 
trend.  Under the requirements of SOLAS Chapter VII and the relevant provisions 
of the IMDG Code, the illustrations of segregation for containers containing 
dangerous goods onboard containerships was approved by the Maritime Safety 
Committee (MSC) in May 2012, which might incur longer time for stowage plan of 
containerships and rising of operating costs.  More importantly, MSC approved in 
May 2014, for adoption at MSC 94 in November 2014, draft amendments to SOLAS 
Chapter VI to require mandatory verification of the gross mass of containers (IMO, 
2014), which will definitely impact the operations of containerships in a far-reaching 
way.  The mandatory requirements aim to promote the safety of containerships, but 
maybe at the expense of higher operation costs for shipowners as the time at port will 
be prolonged for weights verification. 
On the other hand, national rules could limit the ships from growing bigger, though 
not intentionally.  Take Chinese sea ports policies for example, according to MOT’s 
statistics, there were almost one third of the berths across China receiving ships of 
over-approved berthing sizes (Li, 2006).  The first Triple-E--Maersk MC-Kinney 
Moller had to visit Yangshan, Zhoushan, and Yantian in her maiden voyage with 
reduced load, because these terminals had not been officially verified with capability 
of accommodating containerships of that large size (Chen &Wang, 2011, pp.24-29).  
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In January 2014, MOT issued the Rules on the Berthing Capacity of Coastal Ports, 
aiming to exert berth's potentials of Chinese coastal ports by permitting upgrading 
one or two berthing classes provided safety guaranteed to meet port production 
requests for receiving larger ships (MOT, 2014), but still the maximum approved 
sizes of ports by national policies ceil calling ship’s sizes. 
 
4.11 Limitation by cargo canvassing capability.  
Larger containerships bring ports with massive surge of containers discharged in one 
call and the challenge of filling them with cargo on a regular basis.  The economies 
of scale of large-sized containerships could only be achieved under conditions, one 
of the conditions is the high utilization rate, in other words--sufficient cargo to be 
shipped.  Once there is broken stowage, the merits of large-sized containerships will 
be discounted.  The more broken stowage the less merits, and the demerits of 
large-sized ships increase.  There are lessons to be drawn from the development of 
oil tankers, which once pioneered the upsizing trend in the world shipping industry.  
Since 1966, oil tankers had enjoyed a very rapid upsizing evolution from VLCC up 
to ULCC, even super ULCC.  However, with the oil crisis and limitation of world 
crude oil production, the ULCCs and VLCCs exceeding 300,000 tonnes were 
gradually laid up or used for other purposes, not to mention super ULCC (Li & Wang, 
2002, pp.34-35).  For containerships, according to the schedule of Daily Maersk, 
the capacity of every ship in service is bigger than 10,000 TEU, without powerful 
cargo canvassing capability, it is impossible to run the route profitably.  If they 
cannot run these bigger ships profitably due to insufficient cargo, then smaller ships 
will squeeze in and replace them.  Therefore, the upsizing trend of containerships is 
also constrained by the cargo canvassing capability of shipowners. 
 
 






Chapter 5 SWOT Analysis and Recommendations 
 
5.1 SWOT Analysis on employing large-sized containerships for shipowners 
The SWOT analysis is used to find suitable strategy and strategic approach for 
certain organization based on analysis of the four aspects of the internal and external 
environment, namely opportunities, threats, strengths and weaknesses (Wikipedia, 
2014b).  This method was originally developed for business and industry to identify 
the positives and negatives of a choice or decision, and a SWOT analysis can be 
done in many perspectives, but to simplify the situation, the SWOT Analysis is 
carried out from shipowners’ perspective, as shown in Table 7.  Of course, SWOT 
is not the only assessment technique available, with other optional tools such as the 
Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) and Comparative Analysis, but it is a simple yet 
comprehensive way of assessing the positive and negative forces within and without 
a system.  
39 
 
Table 7 - SWOT analysis on the employment of large-sized ships for shipowners. 
Internal External 
Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities Threats 
1. Economies of scale with 
lower unit costs. 
2. High fuel efficiency. 
3. Less emission per unit. 
4. Lower freight charges 
and more competitiveness. 
5. Label of a powerful 
capacity and advertisement. 
6. Bigger TEU capacity. 
 
1. Intensive capital investment. 
2. Risk of overcapacity and low utilization 
rate. 
3. Higher requirements for cargo 
canvassing. 
4. Less route flexibility. 
5. Risk of longer transportation time. 
6. Higher requirements for service level of 
other sectors. 
7. Less effective in emergency response. 
8. Risk of bigger accident.  
9. More port charges per ship. 
10. Risk of diseconomies of scale 
11. Possibility of involving in port facilities 
upgrading or other similar investments. 
1. Growing world seaborne trade and 
container trade. 
2. Advanced shipbuilding 
technologies. 
3. Containerization of cargos. 
4. Development of information 
technology and management systems. 
5. Welcomed by port authorities and 
local administration as a driver of 
local economy. 
6. Development of exclusive container 
terminals and facilities. 
7. Expansion of Canals 
8. Pricing fall of newbuildings. 
9. Fierce competition for hub port 
among port operators. 
1. Low accommodating capacity in 
most ports. 
2. Persistent overcapacity in supply 
market.  
3. Depressed freight market and 
rising fuel prices 
4. Stricter safety requirements in 
navigation, operation and cargo 
handling by national and 
international authorities. 
5. Port operators tend to share, even 
transfer, risks of investment in 
upgrading facilities. 
6. Risk of changes of cargo flow in 
international trade. 
7. Customers’ increasing sensitivity 
of time  
Source: compiled by the author. 
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The SWOT analysis just offers perspectives of employing large containerships for 
shipowners.  Decision-makers cannot make strategic plans simply based on the 
comparison of numbers of strengths and weaknesses or opportunities and threats, 
because the weight of each strength or weakness is different for different shipowners 
according to their own conditions.  Actually, only the strength of economies of scale 
of larger containerships is attractive enough for shipowners.    However, as SWOT 
usually reflects just the current position or situation, it might shield new possibilities.  
So decision-makers should be open to the possibilities that exist within a weakness or 
threat as well as recognizing that an opportunity can become a threat if everyone else 
sees the opportunity and plans to take advantage of it, so the economics of scale of 
large containerships may become threat as every shipowner want to take advantage 
of it and lead to serious overcapacity. 
 
5.2 Recommendations for stakeholders. 
Based on the drivers and constraints analysis as well as the SWOT analysis, the 
following gives some recommendations for the main stakeholders under the upsizing 
trend of containerships. 
 
5.2.1 For shipowners.   
Shipowners
9
 play the leading role in the upsizing trend of containerships, as 
bigger-sized ships are deemed to be cost savings through economies of scale.  
However, the economies of scale could only be achieved under conditions, so 
shipowners should respond to the upsizing trend based on their individual situations, 
rather than following others in a rush.  The recommendations are mainly given in 
six aspects. 
 
                                                             
9 Shipowners here include ship operators. 
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Firstly, take advantages of mega containerships and optimize capacity network.  
Modern larger ships are better designed with economies of scale and fuel efficiency, 
smaller and older designs will gradually be replaced.  However, considering the law 
of marginal cost and diminishing return, it is not the larger the better.  The 
optimized ship size for different owners may differ greatly, as it is decided by 
individual slot costs (Liu & Chen, 2005, pp.57).  The best policy is to take the 
advantages of the mega ships in cutting costs and control the upsizing trend at a 
reasonable pace taking other constraints into account.  At the same time, optimizing 
operation network is a relatively cheap choice for costs cutting and profits earning.  
Under present market, most shipowners are still suffering from losses in the 
container sector.  Although the newbuilding prices have fallen about 40% since 
2008(see Chapter 3, 3.10), ships are still awfully expensive to purchase.  One 
typical example is Maersk Line, which has sought to optimize networks and vessel 
speed to cut costs by carrying out a company-wide retrofit program since 2012 and 
also has not placed any new orders after the Triple-Es (Lin, 2014b).  
 
Secondly, integrate shoreside segments of the transport system.  In recent years, 
more and more VLCSs have been deployed into operation by the major liners, 
wishing to obtain a lower operational cost per TEU.  Yet the economies of scale of 
mega containerships at sea will be largely discounted by the inefficiency or 
mismatching segments on shore, such as the port C&D segment and inland transport 
segment, etc., as the time at berth will be greatly prolonged.  However, the 
inefficiency of segments onshore takes both time and money to improve.  Although 
it is a tough task involving different parties, shipowners should try to integrate 
shoreside segments of the container conveying chain to achieve the overall efficiency 




Thirdly, cooperating with other owners.  With the development of upsizing trend 
of containerships, cooperation among shipowners is strengthened by economic 
motives, such as higher market coverage and service frequency, powerful marketing 
capability, improved freight stabilisation, higher vessel space utilization and better 
cost control (Ma, 2013).  One prevailing way of cooperation is strategic alliance.  
Before June 2014, there are mainly three international strategic alliances formed by 
major liners dominating international container shipping market--the P3, G6 and 
CKYH.  P3 Alliance, formed by top-three players combined provides 56% of the 
services on the Asia-North Europe trade lane.  The G6 Alliance offers a nominal 
55,000TEU average weekly capacity, while the CKYH Alliance with Evergreen 
joining (CKYHE Alliance) offers 43,000TEU (Bennett, 2014).    However, the 
alliances might lead to monopoly, as other ships of shipowners out of the Alliances 
will be squeezed out.  That’s why the P3 Alliance was killed by China’s Ministry of 
Commerce on June 17
th
 2014.  Nevertheless, cooperating with other owners is a 
good way to efficiently operate large containerships. 
 
Fourthly, enhance marketing and cargo-canvassing capacity.  Larger ships carry 
more containers, and need more supply of goods.  Shipowners today not only have 
to compete with others for ships efficiency, but also the canvassing capacity for 
goods.  At the same time, with the increasing TEU capacities of ships, the 
imbalance of containers between two ways in one route will be aggravated due to 
imbalance of cargo flows (Xu, 2007, p5).  Therefore, shipowners should enhance 
their marketing capacity and explore more steady cargo supplies, especially the 
backhaul cargos, to adapt to the increase in shipping capacity.  
Fifthly, adopt differential competition strategy and pay attention to feeder 
services.  The bigger ships become the less flexibility in operation.  When the 
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attention of global shipowners is caught by the mega containerships, one of Lloyd’s 
List’s experts pointed that there were big chances for the feeders (middle and small 
size ships).  The reason is that with the deployment of VLCSs and ULCSs only 
fewer ports will be chosen as direct-calls in order to cut the time in ports, thus 
forming a new structure of ports of call--the hub ports (direct-calls) and the spoke 
ports (the feeder ports).  As the number of hub ports decreases, there are more 
spoke ports leading to more demand for feeder services.  Therefore, shipowners 
could differentiate their strategies according individual conditions, and feeder 
services might be a good chance.  
Sixthly, adapt to policy changes.  Although shipping is an open and free 
competition market, the impacts of the visible hand cannot be ignored.  
International instruments and national regulations concerning containers or 
containerships might be very influential, such as the requirements for emission 
control, segregation of containers containing dangerous goods and verification of 
containers’ weights by IMO.  Shipowners have to develop and adjust strategies to 
adapt to and fulfill the new requirements of policy changes, though sometimes 
adapting to the policies means costs and inefficiency.  
 
5.2.2 For port operators 
Firstly, improve accommodating capacity and service efficiency.  Investments in 
ports will lead to increases in efficiency and lower transport costs by enabling goods 
to get to and from markets in a more timely and cost-effective manner.  As 
forecasted in Chapter 2, the upsizing trend of containerships will continue.  So the 
average sizes of ships received in ports will become bigger and bigger.  In order to 
adapt to the upsizing ships, which require higher cargo handling efficiency and 
deeper water both en route and at berth, port operators should take measures to 
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improve the accommodating capacity and service efficiency.  Measures should 
include but not limit to upgrading infrastructure, optimizing facilities configuration, 
dredging nearby water ways, adopting more advanced and automatized cargo 
handling systems, etc.  
 
Secondly, cooperate with shipowners.  As shipowners chose the ports of call for 
their ships, the development of ports is decided by the strategies of shipowners.  
However, ports are capital intensive investment, yet their fates are in the hands of 
shipowners, thus the best policy is to cooperate with shipowners in building and 
operating of ports.  Moreover, cooperating with shipowners in ports (or terminals 
/berths) is a win-win strategy for both port operators and shipowners.  It alleviates 
the capital pressure of investment and ensures steady port charges
10
 for port 
operators with frequent calls of ships, and it also benefits shipowners by providing 
more suitable and efficient port services for their ships, which can minimize their 
ships’ time in ports and ensure higher level services for shippers.  
 
Thirdly, avoid over investment and vicious competition.  Ports are generally 
considered to be a long-term and capital intensive investment offering steady returns.  
With the polarizing process of Hub ports and Spoke ports caused by the deployment 
of larger ships, no ports used to be direct-calls want to be degraded as feeder ports 
(Xu, 2013, p192), thus port operators are very likely to rush into the tide of pouring 
money in ports to attract shipowners’ attention, which will definitely lead to over 
investment that cannot be recovered and fierce inter-port competitions, even vicious 
competitions without proper coordination (Peng, 2002, p.9).  Therefore, port 
                                                             
10 Ports earn income by charging ships for the use of their facilities, and shipowner may be charged in two ways, 
an ‘all-in’ rate where everything is included; or an ‘add-on’ rate where shipowner pays a basic charge to which 
extras are added for the various services used by the ship during its visit to the port. 
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operators should objectively position their ports in the new Hub-Spoke network of 
world container shipping--whether it is hub or spoke, and take appropriate strategies 
accordingly, instead of simply catering for the VLCSs or ULCSs.  One failure 
example is the Dachan Bay Container Terminal (DCBCT) in western Shenzhen, with 
all the advanced facilities the DCBCT was designed to work as a hub, unfortunately, 
competed with Nansha, Chiwan and Shekou container terminals, it resulted in a 
feeder with huge investment hard to recover.  
 
Fourthly, abide by requirements concerning safety operations.  Port operators 
also face the challenges of safety operations regulated by national rules or 
international instruments.  One example is the berthing capacity of ports, as 
mentioned in Chapter 4.  Different nations have different requirements, as some 
take safety as the paramount factor, while others give priority to economic growth.  
So operators should abide by these regulations and take measures to implement 
related safe operation requirements, such as providing relevant space and facilities 
for the new requirements of verification of containers’ weights.  Nevertheless, 
safety is an important factor for the proper operation of ports, investment in safety 
takes great amount of money, but ignoring safety will cost even greater. 
 
5.2.3 For national administrations 
Firstly, guide the development of upsizing trend of ships by policies.  With 
larger ships comes greater risk, such as risk of safety navigation and operation. 
Although the upsizing trend of ships is the result of free market competition, the risk 
and negative impacts should be controlled and minimized for public interests.  So 
maritime administrations should guide the upsizing trend and limit possible negative 
impacts by publishing related policies.  As to large-sized containerships, more 
exclusively specific safety requirements or standards should be made, such as the 
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standards for ship’s hull strength, requirements for safety navigation and making 
stowage plan, requirements for extra equipment or facilities carrying onboard for 
emergency response, etc.  As to ports, new regulations should be made to guide the 
development of ports catering for the upsizing trend of ships, such as the standards 
for verification of berthing capacities
11
 and requirements for safety operations in 
port.  Also, administrations should provide policy supports to shipowners and port 
operators in financing, as both purchasing large ships and building ports are capital 
intensive and long-term recovering, favorable financing policies will help 
shipowners and port operators to endure market risks. 
 
Secondly, optimize layout of ports.   As the interface of ship and shore in 
transportation system, ports sustain the development of national economy and 
foreign trade.  Also the development of ports will bring taxes, job opportunities and 
flourishing of local economy.  However, under the impacts of upsizing ships, ports 
might spend tremendous money in infrastructure improvement in order to meet the 
requirements of large-sized ships resulting in over investment and vicious inter-port 
competitions.  Administrations should coordinate and optimize the regional layout 
of ports (hub ports and feeder ports) through macroscopic readjustment and control 
to avoid vicious competitions among regional ports.  Especially, maritime 
administrations should be prudent in making plans for exploring new ports in order 
to prevent low-level redundant constructions. 
 
Thirdly, facilitate port clearance.  Port clearance, used to be an important way of 
supervision over ships, is now becoming a service provided for shipowners by 
                                                             
11In recent years, the berthing capacity of Chinese coastal ports increasingly bottlenecks the upsizing trend of 
ships and development of local maritime economies. Many ports resort to the “one ship, one case” principle to 
receive ships of over their approved berthing sizes, which bring about great risk to operation safety and economic 
burden to shipping companies and port operators. 
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administrations.  Efficient port clearance services will save time for shipowners and 
enhance port competitiveness.  Recognizing the importance of ports to local 
economy, administrations should take efforts to promote the facilitation of port 
clearance by adopting advanced information technologies, such as the electronic 
information exchange platforms and EDI platform, which will realize no paper 
clearance and shorten ships time in port (Zhuang, 2001, p.49). 
 
Fourthly, improve inland ports-linked transport system.  The cost advantages of 
mega containerships are constrained by the C&D capability of ports, while the C&D 
capabilities of ports are constrained by the linked inland transport system.  
Administrations should coordinate the integration of inland transport system, 
including rail, road and waterway transshipment, within ports C&D system to ensure 
high efficiency of cargo flows between ships and shore.  As the inland transport 
system is for public welfare, administrations should play a leading role in the 
construction and improvement of the system, though the involvement and 
participation of shipping companies and port operators are very important. 
 
Fifthly, strengthen supervision and emergency response capacities.  
Administrations should not only see the benefits or economic growth brought by the 
upsizing ships, but also pay attention to the safety concerns challenging crew, ship, 
port and environment.  With the VLCSs and ULCSs being deployed in operation, 
the safety concerns have been proved with sound ground by incidents or accidents 
emerging now and then, caused by these gigantic carriers.  So administrations 
should strengthen supervision over the safety operation of mega containerships and 
ports accommodating them through modern technologies without causing much 
inefficiency or barriers to the normal running of them.  Also, the original 
emergency response capacities of administrations challenged by gigantic 
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containerships are in need of updating and upgrading. 
 
5.2.4 For International Maritime Community 
International instruments drafted by International Maritime Community (IMC) are 
becoming more and more compulsory, even mandatory if adopted and implemented 
by sufficient member states, in regulating and guiding the development of global 
shipping industry.    
 
Ordering large-sized ships is the freedom of shipowners, but the pursuit for profit 
will make them blind to risks.  To ensure safe and sustainable development of the 
international shipping industry, IMC, especially IMO, should closely observe and 
guide the upsizing trend of containerships by formulating related standards/guidance 
and implementing more safety-oriented measures.  Besides the standards for ship’s 
particulars and requirements for segregation and weight verification of containers as 
mentioned in Chapter 4, the requirement for report container losses to IMO or other 
international body is still lacking now, with approximately 675 containers lost at sea 
every year (World Shipping Council, 2011, p.1), but no one can get the accurate 
number.  Fortunately, international maritime community has realized the 
importance of ensuring safer shipping in the process of upsizing ships, efforts have 
been taken separately or jointly to ensure safety of ships. 
 
5.2.5 For third party service providers 
Third party service providers (TPSP), such as tugs, pilots, forwarders, cargo agencies, 
booking agencies, etc., play an indispensable role in the upsizing development of 
ships.  On one hand, their service efficiencies and capabilities will greatly influence 
the time in port of mega ships; on the other hand, TPSPs will face fiercer competition 
under the upsizing trend impacts, as for the same amount of cargos, less ships will be 
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needed, thus fewer service providers needed.  Therefore, TPSPs should try to 
improve service level and capability to cater for larger ships, which requires more 
investment and resources.  Also TPSPs should learn strategies from shipowners and 
port operators to cooperation with upper and lower segments of shipping chain, even 





























Chapter 6 Conclusions 
 
The paper restudies the upsizing trend of world containerships, aiming to provide 
more comprehensive perspectives for the stakeholders within the industry.  Based 
on the introduction and discussion of other five chapters, the main findings are 
concluded as follows. 
 
Firstly, the upsizing trend of containerships will continue but approach a new limit.  
On one hand, the economies of scale, together with other drivers discussed in 
Chapter 3, will encourage shipowners to order more large-sized ships to replace the 
existing smaller ones  in order to cut costs, and the maximum size of containerships 
will continue to grow with the rapid evolution of modern technologies towards more 
fuel efficient and economies of scale.  On the other hand, the largest containership 
is approaching the limit under present conditions.  Constraints of diseconomies of 
scale, diseconomies of the transport system, accommodating capability of ports and 
safety operation requirements, etc., will limit the further development of 
containerships’ sizes.  But once the conditions change, the limit will be broken 
again like the previous limits. 
 
Secondly, shipowners should make strategic plan based on their individual conditions 
to adapt to the upsizing trend.  Under the upsizing trend of containerships, the 
container shipping industry has entered an ear of meager profit.  Shipowners fall 
into competitions for lower costs and survival with depressed freight rates.  The 
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optimal composition differs for individual shipowners, so they should make plans 
suitable for themselves and take appropriate measures to ensure best adaptation to 
the upsizing trend.  
 
Thirdly, port operators should well position their ports in the new Hub-Spoke 
network of world container shipping.  The readjustments of direct-calls of large 
containerships bring port operators into fierce competitions and a retrofit to the world 
container shipping network.  During this process, many ports might be degraded to 
feeders, so port operators should objectively and precisely locate their ports’ 
positions in the new Hub-Spoke network, and take appropriate strategies to avoiding 
over investment and vicious competition.  
 
Fourthly, national maritime authorities and international maritime communities 
should closely supervise and actively guide the upsizing trend of containerships.  To 
build any size of ship is the freedom of shipowners regardless of its economic utility 
or fuel efficiency, but the risk of accidents and concerns for safety operations rise 
with the increase of ships’ size.  To minimize weaknesses or possible negative 
impacts of the large-sized ships, national maritime administrations and IMC, should 
closely supervise and guide the upsizing trend of containerships by drafting and 
issuing more safety-oriented standards or requirements. 
 
The upsizing trend of containerships is not a new topic to study, but most of the 
previous studies were limited to economic analysis, size optimization prediction or 
limiting factors introduction.  As to the safety concerns, risk of diseconomies of 
scale and the role of maritime administrations and IMC, they are seldom mentioned 
or discussed, although they are crucial aspects of the upsizing trend.  The paper tries 
to provide a comprehensive perspective of the upsizing trend of containerships by 
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introducing historic development, illustrating drivers and constraints, SWOT 
analysing with abundant data from different sources, and put forward 
recommendations for stakeholders.  Besides containerships, the upsizing trend is 
common for almost all other types of world merchant ships, such as oil tank and bulk 
carrier, also the large-sized ships of different types share similarities of strengths and 
weaknesses.  Therefore, the recommendations and conclusions are meaningful not 
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